Georgetown University Law Center

Scholarship @ GEORGETOWN LAW

2003

Rex E. Lee Conference on the Office of the Solicitor General of the
United States: Panel for Former Solicitors General
Seth P. Waxman
Georgetown University Law Center, waxman@law.georgetown.edu

Walter E. Dellinger III
Duke Law School

Kenneth W. Starr
Department of Justice

Charles Fried
Department of Justice

Drew S. Days III
Yale Law School

This paper can be downloaded free of charge from:
https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/350

2003 BYU L. Rev. 153-183 (2003)
This open-access article is brought to you by the Georgetown Law Library. Posted with permission of the author.
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub
Part of the Legal History Commons, and the Litigation Commons

GEORGETOWN LAW
Faculty Publications

April 2010

Rex E. Lee Conference on the Office of the
Solicitor General of the United States: Panel for
Former Solicitors General
2003 BYU L. Rev. 153-183 (2003)

Seth P. Waxman

Walter E. Dellinger III

Distinguished Visitor from Practice
Georgetown University Law Center
waxman@law.georgetown.edu

Acting Solicitor General, 1996-1997

Kenneth W. Starr

Charles Fried

Solicitor General, 1989-1993

Solicitor General, 1985-1989

Drew S. Days, III
Solicitor General, 1993-1996
This paper can be downloaded without charge from:
Scholarly Commons: http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/350/
Posted with permission of the author

1]

Solicitor General Conference

Panel of Former Solicitors General
Charles Fried: Solicitor General, 1985-1989.
Kenneth W. Starr: Solicitor General, 1989-1993.
Drew S. Days, III: Solicitor General, 1993-1996.
Walter E. Dellinger, III: Solicitor General, 1996-1997.
Seth P. Waxman: Solicitor General, 1997-2001.
Professor Thomas R. Lee245 : I have been asked to moderate
this final session. What I would like to do is, in the first instance,
direct a question to one member of the panel and then ask for maybe
two or three others to respond to the comments that have been
made or give some other further response to my question. Many of
these issues have been covered to some degree in earlier sessions, and,
I think one of the opportunities we will have here is for some
discussion and debate, comparing and contrasting the views of the
solicitors general who are here with us today.
Let me start by reading from the Judiciary Act of 1870,246 and let
me start by directing this question to General Starr. I was going to
start with General Fried, but he asked me to direct a different
question to him that he is also interested in answering. So, General
Starr, let me start with you. The statute says: "There shall be an
officer learned in the law to assist the Attorney General. ,,247 An
oversimplified organizational structure might tell us, then, that the
hierarchal relationship here runs from the president to the attorney
general and down to the solicitor general. I would like you to talk
about that relationship, the relationship that the solicitor general has
to the attorney general and also to the president, and specifically
discuss, if you would, the obligations, the responsibilities, that the
solicitor general has to communicate with the attorney general and

245. Associate Professor of Law, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young
University.
246. Judiciary Act ofl870, ch. 150,16 Stat. 162 (1870).
247. 28 U.S.C. § 505 (2000).
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with the president. And then I will ask other members of the panel
to respond.
Kenneth Starr: I think the statute is wonderfully straightforward
and simple: "to assist the Attorney General." I found in my own
experience that that meant when the phone rang and it was"Would you please cover a moot court for me in the following
wonderful law school in some remote hamlet?" (not Provo!)-the
answer was always "Yes," unfailingly "Yes." One simply tried to assist
the attorney general in a variety of ways.
I found in my own experience, in contrast to that of Solicitor
General Lee, whose memory we honor in the course of this
gathering, that I was not being summoned about substantive matters
with any regularity, and I have been struck by the comments thus far
by my colleagues as to the collaborative and collegial kind of
arrangement that included consultations with the president. The
only time I was consulted by or, I should say, directed by the
president, was to overrule me on a particular matter. It was a narrow
matter, but obviously of importance to the president. So, I found in
my own experience-and I think this is consistent within the
traditions of the office-growing out of that simple statute, that the
solicitor general is expected to carry on the duties of the office and
to report, to provide information about those issues that the attorney
general should know about, as well as the deputy attorney general,
and for the last generation, in the main, the associate attorney
general, given the division of responsibility in the department.
That [was] in contrast to General Lee's experience, which was so
wonderfully explained by Solicitor General Olson last evening at the
marvelous banquet. Rex would be with us, as John Roberts will
recall, literally daily for the attorney general's staff meeting. I do not
know this, but I think there may have been [some] in the Office of
the Solicitor General that questioned whether that was really
appropriate. Is the appearance of the solicitor general literally daily
going down the halls of the fifth floor and joining in the attorney
general's senior leadership daily meeting appropriate? I felt it was, for
similar reasons that I thought it was appropriate that the attorney
general saw fit to summon the FBI Director with regularity, and
also, if he so chose, to literally have an office in the FBI. We were all
part of one organized whole. And Rex was not there to have his
judgment overridden. He was there to provide timely information as
154
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well as to provide his excellent judgment on a wide range of matters.
And again, I thought that was an entirely appropriate role.
But in my experience serving under Attorney General [Richard]
Thornburgh and Attorney General [William] Barr, there was less
day-to-day engagement. We did have a weekly meeting with the
solicitor general alone, and John [Roberts] would handle that in my
absence, where we would really just give a report. It was typically a
one-way report: "Here is in fact what is going on." The sense I had,
and I guess the lesson that I draw from that, is that there really is
overwhelmingly a culture of deference that obtains among the
various senior officers of the Justice Department and that, I think,
goes as well with respect to the White House. Our colleagues from
the Clinton administration will comment, I hope, before this larger
audience in terms of relationships with the president and perhaps
with senior White House staff. My own experience was [that] we had
very limited contact. I am not suggesting it as a virtue, but it simply
is a fact that it was viewed as unwise for the White House Counsel's
Office to be weighing in with the solicitor general. If there was an
expression of concern, it would come to the attorney general or the
deputy attorney general.
Not that the culture of independence was being vaunted-far
from it. We viewed ourselves as an integral part of the Justice
Department, to assist in ways that might be entirely unexpected.
There was also a cultural outlook that we were an organization
presented from time to time with very challenging missions.
Maureen Mahoney made some of these comments at yesterday
afternoon's session of the Bush panel-namely, that we would be
called upon, as Ted Olson has been called upon, to handle a variety
of sticky-wicket matters. She recalled, and I recall not entirely
pleasantly, nocturnal PI hearings in the Southern District of Florida,
and I found myself on the floor leading the team. I recall our
beloved now-Judge Bill Bryson, a very distinguished deputy solicitor
general during our watch, being summoned by the attorney general
personally. The matter was the assertion by Manuel Antonio
Noriega 248 that he was entitled to prisoner of war status under the
Geneva Conventions. That, I am sure, was an issue the district

248. Noriega, the former president of Panama, was captured by United States troops and
brought to the United States, where he was tried and convicted in April 1992 on charges of
racketeering, money laundering, and drug trafficking.
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attorney's office in Miami had not handled with any regularity, nor
had a lot of lawyers in the Justice Department. Frankly, neither had
Bill Bryson, but the attorney general knew that in that cadre of
lawyers, and especially among the career civil servants in that office,
were people where the interest of the United States would be best
protected. I found that kind of special assignment throughout the
process. I did not hear a lot of grumbling about this, you know, but
[occasionally someone] might say in the office or outside [the
office], "Is this proper?" But of course it is [proper]; we simply exist
statutorily to assist the attorney general and, through the attorney
general, [to assist] the president and the causes that the executive
branch calls upon the office to do.
The final thing I will say is that-and this was a very substantial
expenditure of time-that I was asked, I think again consistently
with the statute, to take on the responsibility for heading up a
working group on civil justice reform, to have a very elaborate
inter-agency and also outreach process to the legal community and
then to fashion recommendations. Unusual, but again, I think, a
tribute to the office and the expertise of the office in a wide variety
of matters.
Thomas Lee: Thank you, General Starr. Responses to General
Starr's comments or further thoughts about the relationship between
the solicitor general and his bosses?
Charles Fried: Just one word. And this comments more on the
reports by the Clinton people, particularly Walter's frequent
encounters with his president. I had none except our formal social
events with the president. And the reason, I think, is very clear.
Walter's president was a former law professor. My president was a
former governor, but very far from a former law professor. And the
same is true of Ken's president, and for that matter, Ted Olson's
president.
Walter Dellinger: A second comment on that. I am surprised at
the notion that was put about at the time of the Bakkt?49 decision,
which Drew Days was involved in as head of the Civil Rights
Division. (There is a very famous book for those of you who do not

249. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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know it, The Tenth Justice, by Lincoln Caplan. 2SO ) A couple of things
about that are interesting. The administration had formulated a
position to take on affirmative action. I believe, if I am correct, that
Frank Easterbrook was the assistant to the solicitor general who did
the first memorandum. The notion is, should the White House have
interfered with what policy was being developed by the career people
in the Solicitor General's Office? It does strike me as odd on a
question like that, where I think the Constitution is open-ended, and
certainly the precedents were open-ended, that there should be any
question but that the president ought to have a say in where his
administration is going to urge the Court to go. I will say that I am
second to no one in my admiration for Judge Frank Easterbrook, but
I do not understand why a Carter-Mondale administration would
have its policy set by Frank Easterbrook. What you do want is his
best thinking on the issue as part of the process. More at OLC, the
Office of Legal Counsel, but also to some extent at the SG's Office, I
never addressed a sensitive issue without involving career people
from previous administrations. The great protection of a political
appointee is to take career people who came in under different
presidents and get their involvement. So, I think that is critically
important.
But the other aspect of that is who talks to whom. There was a
notion that Wade McCree was protecting Solicitor General Lee from
White House pressure. I, for one, would not want anyone in the
White House speaking to the attorney general or the deputy attorney
general instead of speaking to me about a matter within the bailiwick
of the Solicitor General's Office. Not that they are not free to do so,
but I would want to be included in such a conversation and have it
myself. By the same token, I would never want them speaking to
career people without our direct permission. That is why you have
political people who can stand up to that.
The reason for meeting with the president personally, though
I do agree it is because [the president] would be involved, is so that
the office, or the department, is not pushed around by more political
functionaries in the White House political operation. By having
direct access to the president, [I could say] as solicitor general,
"They are wrong. Here is why it is not in the interest of the United
States, and here is why their interest is short-sighted and political."
250. CAPLAN,supranote 23.
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In guarding the role of the office, it seems to me the issue should
not be independence, because independence means independence
for people who are elected by the people of the United States. So it
is hard to maintain that as an ultimate virtue. What we seek from
independence [for the SG's Office] is that the United States'
positions reflect the long-range interest of the United States and are
based on arguments that are made with professional responsibility
and are respectful of the Court's precedents. You can achieve that, I
think, more often by engaging at the highest levels of the
administration rather than by trying to wall the office off. But in
different administrations, there may be different styles on that point.
Drew Days: I think that is really the fact, that there are a
number of different personal styles that vary from administration to
administration and there are administrations where solicitors general
met with presidents. I think of Archibald Cox and John F. Kennedy.
The reason why they met was because they had a prior relationship.
Archibald Cox was an advisor to Senator John Kennedy and,
therefore, it was perfectly natural for the president to reach out to
someone who had been his advisor for a number of years.
But in other circumstances, I think that is quite problematic. For
one thing, unless one has a personal relationship with the president,
it is not clear that one gets to the president very often. One is talking
to surrogate presidents or self-declared mini-presidents. And I do
not think that really is a productive use of one's time as a solicitor
general. I found in the Clinton administration during the few times
that I went over to the White House, that when I talked to lawyers
there, I found myself suddenly surrounded by a group of munchkins
who came in the door and proceeded to kibitz about legal issues
they knew nothing of. And so I took to meeting with lawyers from
the White House outside of the White House. We had very nice
lunches together where we could talk law without the echo and the
peanut gallery.
You mentioned the Bakke case. The situation there was that the
president of the United States trusted the attorney general totally,
and he basically said to the attorney general, "I trust you to make a
decision. I am not trusting the vice president or the head of the
domestic counsel to make these decisions. If they want to say things,
listen to them, but you are the ultimate decision-maker in that
matter, and if you decide that Wade McCree and Drew Days should
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work this out without having calls from the vice president or some
other people in the White House, that is fine with me." So that is
the dynamic of that situation.
But I agree with you; the notion that we should think of the
solicitor general as independent of the president is terribly
misguided. In fact, I have told this story before, so forgive me if you
have heard me tell it. But what turned out to be my job interview
with President Clinton was on the day that Janet Reno was
confirmed as attorney general. I went into the Oval Office with
President Clinton, and I was prepared for a linear interrogation: you
know, question one, and then followed by question two, and so
forth. But no; it was kind of an Arkansas get-acquainted meeting, a
comfort-level type of conversation. And well into the meeting, the
president looked at me in his inimitable fashion and said, "What is
the relationship between the president and the solicitor general?"
And I said, "Mr. President, you are in the Constitution and the
solicitor general is not." I somewhat regretted that after the fact,
giving him that insight. But I really believe that.
I have worked in two Justice Departments and two
administrations. And as I mentioned, President Carter was pretty
much a delegator of his responsibility to the attorney general and
fiercely protected people in the Justice Department from all kinds of
interference, interventions, telephone calls, and so forth. That is one
way to run a Justice Department. But upon reflection over the years,
I am not sure that it is the most responsive to the constitutional
framework. It worked, I think, for the Carter administration. But I
think the notion that everybody understands that the president is the
ultimate decision-maker under Article II is very healthy and helpful
to the way that the process works.
Let me say one more thing about the attorney general. Again,
this varies from administration to administration, but I saw my
relationship with Janet Reno as a symbiotic one, that we were really
reinforcing one another in a number of ways that were productive
and constructive. I always realized that she could overrule me, but I
think she always realized that I spent more time thinking about a lot
of the issues that were confronting the Justice Department at the
Supreme Court and the lower court levels than she did, and that that
worked out very well.
But there are situations where the relationship can be very
painful for one or the other of those officers. Robert Jackson was
159
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solicitor general before he became attorney general. He never made
the transition in terms of who should argue cases before the Supreme
Court, as I understand it, and so he was continually muscling in and
taking over matters that by rights should have been handled by the
solicitor general.

Seth Waxman: I agree entirely that the chain of command is
clear and that the Framers managed to make it all the way through
all the articles of the Constitution without even conceiving of a
solicitor general, let alone bothering to mention an attorney general.
It is important nonetheless to distinguish between those things the
solicitor general does pursuant to the longstanding notice-andcomment regulation, and the other things a solicitor general may do
pursuant to his (and, someday, her!) statutory obligation to be of
general assistance to the attorney general.
As to the former-representing the United States in the Supreme
Court, deciding when the United States should appeal in any court,
authorizing amicus participation in any appellate court, and
authorizing intervention in defense of the constitutionality of an act
of Congress-the solicitor general's job is to make decisions. It is not
to make recommendations. It is not to seek advice. It is to stop the
buck on his desk, make a considered decision, and decide when the
policy implications of the decision are of sufficient magnitude that
the attorney general and, in some cases the president, should be
advised.
As to all other things-the sort of free-floating assistance Ted
Olson is performing for the president and the attorney general now
in the context of the USA PATRIOT Act/ 51 and which the rest of us
did in other contexts, the scope of engagement and responsibility
depends much more on the needs, practices, and proclivities of the
president or the attorney general.
The precise contours of the relationship between the solicitor
general, on the one hand, and the attorney general and the
president, on the other, depends on both the background strengths
and inclinations of the other two and the personalities of all three.
During my tenure at the Department of Justice, I had the benefit of

251. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA PATIUOT Act), Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat.
272 (2001).
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the opportunity personally to observe Drew Days' relationship with
Attorney General Reno, and Walter Dellinger's relationship with
both the attorney general and the president. That helped me
enormously in navigating my own course between, and with, the two
of them. I think this was especially important in my case because I
had never worked with, or even known, either Janet Reno or Bill
Clinton before I joined the government.
I think Charles Fried's observation-about the difference it made
that President Clinton was both a lawyer and a former constitutional
law professor-is a singular insight. I will give you one anecdotal
example (about which I have previously spoken and written) just to
give you an example of what a difference it makes.
The event occurred long before I became solicitor general.
Indeed, I had been working for the United States for only three
weeks, as an associate deputy attorney general. Bill Bryson, the
acting associate attorney general (as well as a deputy solicitor
general) invited me to accompany him to the White House where we
were expected to explain to the counsel to the president why the
United States had taken the position it did in a case called Christians
v. Crystal Evangelical Church. 252 The case involved the
constitutionality of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
["RFRA"F 53 and the application of that Act to an attempt by Julia
Christians, who was the trustee in bankruptcy, to recover for the
church a $40,000 tithe that parishioners had made en route to filing
for personal bankruptcy. The bankruptcy trustee said, "Under the
Bankruptcy Code, that is a fraudulent conveyance, and I would like
the money back." The litigation concerned whether she could do
that consistent with the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, and
whether, in that application at least, the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act was constitutional. The United States filed a brief in
the case saying that the Act was constitutional and that a
contribution to the church should be treated the same way as, say, a
contribution to the Boy Scouts; this was not their money, this was
their creditors' money.
I had not heard about the case but went with Bill Bryson to
explain our position (I did a lot of reading in the space of an hour!).
252. Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church (In re Young), 82 F.3d 1407 (8th Cir.
1996).
253. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4
(1996).
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Apparently, the president had heard about this; he had a very, very
strong interest in the Free Exercise Clause. It was my first trip to the
White House. 1 asked Bill, "What's this going to be like?" And he
(having worked for his entire career at the Department of Justice)
said, "I have no idea: this is my first trip to the White House too."
We went into the Counsel's office, and started explaining the case.
And after several minutes, the president himself walked in. 1 had
never met him. He asked what we were discussing, and his counsel
explained. And he said, "Well, I'd like to hear about that." He sat
down, listened, and then started peppering us with questions about
Sherbert v. Verner2 54 and other Religion Clause precedents-many of
which 1 could not readily bring to mind. 1 remember being
absolutely amazed that he could recall these cases and recall their
holdings. My vivid memory is of thinking to myself, "This guy is the
leader of the free world, and he's spending twenty minutes talking
about First Amendment doctrine."
We heard nothing from the White House for two or three
months. One day 1 received a call from the White House Counsel
saying, "The president has been considering this Christians matter,
and he has decided that the position the United States took is
wrong. He has directed that the brief be withdrawn." 1 hung up the
phone, called Bill Bryson, and said, "Look, 1 don't know how often
this happens, but the president of the United States has directed that
this brief be withdrawn. Has the court decided the case?" He said, "I
don't know."
We made several calls. It turned out that the oral argument
before the Eighth Circuit was scheduled for the very next day. The
career lawyer from the Civil Division was already in the city at which
the argument was to occur. We didn't reach him until the next
morning-just as he was preparing to take a cab to the courthouse.
Needless to say, he was a little stunned. So was the lawyer for trustee
Christians, with whom he was dividing the argument. So was the
Eighth Circuit.
That anecdote provides a useful context, 1 think, for the
relationship 1 had with the president. We didn't meet or discuss cases
very often. But 1 felt entirely free when something of the magnitude
of Dickerson255 or Piscatawaj56 arose to ask for some of his time.

254. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
255. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
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The point was not to ask him what on earth the United States
should do. That's a decision in the first instance for the solicitor
general to make. The purpose of the meeting was to make sure,
given how important the issues were, to make sure that he agreed
that the position we proposed to take represented an appropriate
exercise of his constitutional authority. It is, after all, his
constitutional authority, not the solicitor general's or the attorney
general's.
Thomas Lee: To move on to a different line of questioning,
General Fried, let me ask you about the topic that you and I were
discussing just before I stood up, which has to do with whether and
under what circumstances the solicitor ought to urge the overruling
of a decision of the United States Supreme Court. We were talking
about the fact that during my father [Rex Lee]'s tenure as solicitor
general, his approach to the abortion cases was to attempt to whittle
away at them at the fringes but not to urge their overruling quite
directly and that that was one of the first things that you did as
solicitor general. So, maybe you can address that question
specifically, and in general we will ask for other responses from the
other members of the panel.
Charles Fried: Well, first of all, it is sometimes said-I think it
was said a number of times in the course of this conference-that the
solicitor general must always act with deference to the Supreme
Court, and with courtesy-that goes without saying. But the
implication, and sometimes the explicit implication, is that it also
means that one must stay within the precedents of the Supreme
Court. Now, the latter is plainly and manifestly wrong.
I think every solicitor general at some point has asked the
Supreme Court to reconsider and overrule some of its prior
decisions. Walter spoke about asking the Supreme Court to
reconsider and overrule, which they did in the Agostini257 case, the
previous very wrong decisions in Aguila,y.58 and Grand Rapids/ 59
and that was a fine thing to do. One does not know how the law
256.
521 U.S.
257.
258.
259.

Taxman v. Bd. of Educ. of Piscataway, 91 F.3d 1547 (3d Cir. 1996), cert.grallted,
1117 (1997), cert. dismissed, 522 U.S. 1010 (1997).
Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
Sch. Dist. v. Ball,473 U.S. 373 (1985).
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could possibly progress and develop if this were really an inhibition. I
certainly did on a number of occasions. In a case having to do with
the jurisdiction of military tribunals, I asked as an act of piety to my
old boss John Harlan that they overrule a terrible decision by Justice
Douglas, called Q JCallahan,260 in the case called Solorio,261 and they
did. That is how the law changes.
The abortion situation was different because in that case it was
rather unlikely that the Court would indeed overrule Roe v. Wade,262
but here was the situation. At that time, I was not solicitor general; I
was acting solicitor general. [Rex Lee] had left to go into private
practice, and a permanent solicitor general had not yet been named.
I had no expectation that it would be me. This was just where I was,
and here was the job. I got, in the ordinary course,
recommendations from relevant divisions in the department
recommending that we ask for overruling. And here is what I knew.
I knew that Roe v. Wade, decided in 1973, had been severely
criticized not [only] on right-to-life grounds, but on the grounds
that it was a very poorly reasoned decision and a very bad piece of
constitutional law. People like Paul Freund, Archibald Cox, and
John Ely were on record in writing as having said that, and the case,
of course, had continued to be very controversial. The president,
[Ronald Reagan], had been elected, in part in the face of this
controversy, stating his view over and over again that this was a
terribly wrong decision.
Now, at that point, the question came to me: should I not, in an
appropriate brief, present that issue to the Supreme Court, even
though they were unlikely to accept it? It had never been presented
to them squarely before. I saw no excuse for not presenting that
issue, and so I did. I presented it in terms of the jurisprudential
defects of Roe v. Wade because that was the-how should I say"professionally correct" defect in the case. I did not present it in
terms of right to life. I did not present it, as some people were
urging me to do, to say that the unborn were persons protected by
the Due Process Clause and so on and so forth, that in fact it would
be unconstitutional to allow abortion (which, by the way, is the
position taken by the very excellent German constitutional court, so

260. O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969).
261. Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435 (1987).
262. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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it is not a crazy position at all), but that was not the ground. The
ground we presented seemed to be appropriate. A majority of the
Court brushed it aside, although interestingly enough-Roe v. Wade
had been seven to two-this decision was five to four. 263 So it is not
as if it had not reached some minds.
It came up again at a very strange moment. As I said I would, I
had left the office with the end of my president's term, and I was
back at Harvard teaching. Ken had not yet been confirmed, and
there was a brief in there from the Department of Justice saying Roe
v. Wade should be overruled. 264 And the president asked me: would I
come back to argue it? Now, I was a law professor at Harvard. I had
no duty to anybody (except to meet my classes), but it seemed to me
appropriate that somebody who had held that office present this
argument to the Supreme Court. There had been a number of new
Justices on the Court who had not ruled on it, and it seemed to me
correct that this position about which the president felt very
strongly, and the administration felt strongly, should be presented. I
recall that I presented it in an argument which said that, of course,
that does not mean that the states could do anything they wanted.
For instance, they could not pass brutal, anti-abortion legislation. I
expected to be questioned about that, and I was questioned, "What
do you mean by that, Mr. Fried?" And I said, "For instance,
legislation which allows you to disregard the health of the mother."
And I suggested legislation which confused abortion and
contraception to the point where perhaps even contraception might
fall under a legislative cloud which would unravel things all the way
back to Griswold. 265 And I said quite explicitly, "We are not asking
for that. We do not ask to unravel the law that far."
Again, the Webster case resulted in a very confused opinion, one
which indicated considerable sympathy, much more than in the
previous instance, for the overruling position. So, it is not surprising
to me-it seems to me exactly correct-that Ken in the C asey 66 case
should forthrightly have put that position, as he did.
Now, I think, a further thing. If I were solicitor general
tomorrow and were asked to do it again, I would not because I think

263.
264.
265.
266.

Thornburgh v. Am. Coil. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986).
See Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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the Casey case has clearly given the Court the full opportunity to
consider whether they want to overrule this decision. All the new
members of the Court have now stood up and been heard from. To
bring it up again would simply be harassment, and I would not do it.
Indeed, I think for the time being, and perhaps really for a very long
time, that issue is settled and I hope it is behind us.
Kenneth Starr: It seemed even to be settled at a political level in
light of Attorney General Ashcroft's comments at his confirmation
hearing.
I wanted to make a very brief comment, if I may, Tom, with
respect to the broader issue. Stare decisis values have to be, it seems
to me, assessed against the values of stability in the law. That is to
say, is there really a sense of stability that the issue has truly been
settled in a way that has been understood-has not seemed to sow
seeds of confusion-and the precedent or the line of precedent does
not stand as inimical, or as an obstacle, to the implementation of
sensible public policies?
On this panel, Walter can probably most authoritatively speak to
the Establishment Clause jurisprudence, in light of his success as
acting solicitor general in guiding and shaping some very important
doctrine-and I think that story richly deserves to be retold here.
But I want to use the Establishment Clause as another example,
because the Court just seemed not to be able to come to rest with
respect to something very basic: what does the Establishment Clause
mean? There was the Lemon v. Kurtzman 267 test, and then Justice
O'Connor came up with the endorsement test in the context of a
creche,268 but conclud[ed] that that was not an endorsement. So one
tended to wonder: what does that mean, and what does that add to
understanding? Then when it came time to assess very important
questions of public policy, namely, Congress's actions and the
president'S actions in the 1960s in providing salutary programs to
inner-city or needy children, doctrine was really standing in the way.
And it seems to me under those circumstances that you can say,
"Lemon v. Kurtzman was on the books for so long, but were there
expressions of discontent?" And there were. With the example [of
Lemon], five Justices had expressed dismay at that particular test and

267. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
268. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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how unhelpful it was. So I think that part of the lawyering craft is to
[ask] how stable is that body of precedent, and then what kind of
deleterious effects is it having on issues that are very important to the
president and, really, to the American people?
Drew Days: For me the most interesting part of what Charles
said about seeking the overruling of a Supreme Court precedent is,
"in an appropriate brief." And for me, that means not only an
appropriate piece of paper, but appropriate work that has been done
in the lower courts to develop a record-to have some factual basis
for suggesting to the Court that the terms that it had available to it
to rule in the earlier case have in fact changed; the circumstances
have changed in a way that it really makes adherence to that
precedent untenable.
Thomas Lee: Let me ask General Days if he would respond to
the next line of questions. It has to do with the change of
administrations and what the solicitor general ought to do looking
back at policies or positions that might have been taken by a prior
administration. One way of thinking about this, I suppose, is what is
the standard of review? Is it a de novo standard? Is it a clearly
erroneous standard? Is it an abuse of discretion standard? Or is it
maybe something even more deferential than that?
Drew Days: I am not sure what the right standard is, but I went
into the office thinking that it was my responsibility to maintain
continuity in the law to the greatest extent possible and not take
office on the assumption that I could start from scratch and simply
ignore what had been done by prior administrations. Let me give
you an example of that.
Walter Dellinger mentioned earlier the Barclays Bank case. 269 It
was true that the president had a position on the taxing of
multinational corporations. And to follow up on Seth's comment
about the president, not only did he have views on this issue, but
they were informed views, and they were probably correct views on
this issue because as a former governor he had had experience with
transfer pricing and the movement of money across country
boundaries to avoid taxation in places with unfavorable provisions.

269. Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal., 512 U.S. 298 (1994).
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But Bill Clinton, the candidate, took the posItIon during the
campaign that if he were elected president, he would enter the
Barclays Bank case on the side of California, which is the position
that we ultimately took. So that is one set of circumstances: a
president committed politically, law professor, lawyer. The message
has been sent and received by the solicitor general.
But the solicitor general sits down and looks through the briefs
that have been filed by his predecessors in the Solicitor General's
Office, and they seem to point in the other direction. What is the
right answer under those circumstances? Well, I will tell you. The
right answer is to do what the president wants. (Since I had tenure at
Yale Law School, I just told my staff that I might be gone, but they
would be fine.) But I felt a responsibility to the Court in changing
position on this issue, to explain how I arrived at that result, that it
was not tossing darts at a board and just deciding that that was the
right mark and going ahead. We spent a great deal of time-the
White House, the Treasury Department, the State Departmentessentially conducting an autopsy of how my predecessor, Ken Starr,
and some of his people came to the conclusion that they did. And I
felt by the time we filed our brief that I had lived up to my
responsibility to the president, but also lived up to my responsibility
to the Office of Solicitor General.
Walter Dellinger: Let me add that I do think that there is a very
strong stare decisis weight to be given to positions taken by the
United States and that one needs to persuade a president of that fact.
But presidents, on the other hand, are elected. Sometimes they stand
for something. No one has, I think, done that more clearly than
President Reagan. Not everyone agreed with what he stood for, but
few candidates in modern times, perhaps George McGovern, have
made it clearer what they stood for than Ronald Reagan did. And he
won. My defense of Charles Fried is that someone ought to be
authorized to tell the Supreme Court that a new president thinks
they are on the wrong course on a matter like Roe v. Wade, and that
seems to me to be appropriate.
Let me compare it to OLe. OLC is the Office of Legal Counsel,
the next ranking position in the department, actually carved out of
the rib of the Solicitor General's Office, which used to do both
functions of providing legal advice to the government. The
argument that there ought to be independence in the solicitor
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general is actually much more apt for the Office of Legal Counsel
because the Office of Legal Counsel is making legal rulings binding
on the executive branch. You are telling the executive officials, "No.
You may not do something." You are a lawmaker. You are at times
telling the attorney general or the deputy attorney general, "I will
not give you a legal opinion that you can undertake an extraordinary
rendition by doing steps A, B, and C and omitting step D." They
will not overrule you on that, and you should make that [judgment]
independently because they are the action officers. They need to get
legal advice that what they are 'going to do is lawful, and they do not
want to overrule that advice and then follow it. There is no
protection there. Whereas the solicitor general is often an advocate.
So there is more reason to suggest that the solicitor general should
follow some policy direction than OLC, which is giving legal advice.
I can say that though I had interactions with the White House,
not once in the more than a year that I was in the office was the
position taken by the senior career people ever overruled during that
time. And I think people have different styles for doing it. Mine was,
because I think I had a more open communication than the attorney
general, exactly the opposite of what would have been the case with
Griffin Bell and President Carter. President Clinton and Attorney
General Reno were not close and did not have an easy relationship.
It was easier for me than for others to defend the position of the
career people by going to the White House. And so I think it is very
context-specific.
But the last footnote is on a president that knows the law. We
had one case I argued for the United States, William Jefferson
Clinton v. Paula Corbin Jones,270 where I represented not President
Clinton, but the United States. The difference was quite clear in my
mind. If the president had called me the night before the argument
and had given me cases that he had been reading that he thought I
should cite that I did not think were in the interest of the United
States, I would have decided not to cite those cases, and maybe the
case would not have come out so well if I had, but that is my favorite
example.

Seth Waxman: I think it is worth underscoring a point that is
often obscured, and that is the almost infinitesimally minute extent
270. Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997).
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to which a change in administration will have a palpable consequence
to the positions taken or the arguments made either by the solicitor
general in the Supreme Court or in cases over which the solicitor
general has authority in the lower courts. So long as the men and
women who work in the Justice Department understand that what
matters is the long-term institutional interest of the United States,
the political leadership does not, cannot, and should not have that
much sway. Michael Dreeben did as good a job this morning as
anyone I've ever heard in setting forth the different ways to think
about what it means to consider the interests of the United States. It
means a very great deal more than following the political
predilections of the person who happens to be president at the time.
I did not have the occasion to follow a solicitor general of
another party. I never had to confront whether I was going to
disavow a position taken by my predecessor. In the past year, of
course, many people have asked me, "Is Ted Olson going to adhere
to the position that you took before the Supreme Court in X or Yor
Z?" My response always is, "I can't speak for the solicitor general,
but the positions that we took were positions that represented the
views of the United States." The merits brief filed by Solicitor
General Olsen in the Adarand 271 case tracks to a micron the position
Solicitor General Waxman took in the brief filed at the petition stage
of that case.
We filed our brief in the Palazzolo272 case, an important Just
Compensation Clause case while I was SG, but the case was argued
after President Bush had been inaugurated. It occurred to me while I
was preparing the brief that the president and the person I assumed
would be solicitor general might have personal views about the Just
Compensation Clause that would not coincide with the position
reflected in the brief. I strove to be extra certain that the position we
were advocating was in fact consistent with what the United States
had always said, and that that position was indeed in the
government's best interest.
So the instances in which there has been an "overruling" are very
few and far between. One thinks about the different views of the
constitutionality of the must-carry provisions in the Cable Act273 that
271.
272.
273.
102-385,

Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Mineta, 534 U.S. 103 (2001).
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001).
Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No.
106 Stat. 1460. For the must-carry provisions, see 47 U.S.C. §§ 534-535 (2000).
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existed between Ken Starr and Drew Days, or the First Amendment
questions in the Corporation for Public Broadcasting case 274 that
came up between the Carter and Reagan administrations. In both
instances, the government changed positions. But these really are at
the margins. I think the real testament is continuity.
Charles Fried: The place where you saw the greatest temptation,
and in fact temptation properly yielded to, was not so much in
posi tions taken by the solicitor general bu t [in those] taken
elsewhere in the department. When the Reagan administration came
in, they found that there were consent decrees literally littering the
legal landscape which sought to tie the government down till the
end of time to very dubious positions. The Reagan administration
did undertake to challenge those consent decrees, and I think we
have something of that happening again with what one might call
midnight regulations and midnight consent decrees that were put in
by the Clinton administration. I think those are perhaps going to
find themselves reconsidered.
Earlier on there was some discussion of the Boston Harbor
case.275 Maureen [Mahoney] talked about how the Bush
administration took a politically painful but principled decision in
favor of the decision that finally came out. Completely correct. I
argued that case on behalf of the labor unions. The president then,
in an attempt to meet the objection of his constituency that pushed
the other way, sought to establish more or less the same policy by
executive order. And I will report that the first action of President
Clinton was to rescind that executive order. And among the first
actions of President Bush was to reinstate it. So, at these political
levels, you get something quite different than continuity. But after
all, that is what elections are for.
Walter Dellinger: But there is a point for continuity that I took
one step further. When I met with President Clinton to discuss with
him my need to return to private life, I came prepared to discuss who
should be nominated to be solicitor general. I gave him a list of ten
See also Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997) (upholding constitutionaliry of
must-carry provisions).
274. CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367 (1981).
275. Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Associated Builders & Contractors of
Mass./R.I., Inc., 507 U.S. 218 (1993).
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people in several different categories. At the end of the day, I told
him he should promptly nominate Seth Waxman. I told him that I
thought the Senator from Utah 276 would see that he was promptly
confirmed, and that would be good for the office. [I told him] why
Seth was the best choice. But I wanted to give the president a range
of choices.
I think I shocked him a bit. First I said, "An easy category is, you
ought to consider one of the senior chief [circuit court] judges, the
people who have the status of chief judges whom the Court would
see as a peer. That is one way to look at this. But another category,"
I said, "I want you to think about is, given the difficulty the United
States has in defending its positions on federalism, etcetera, I think
there is something to be said to consider naming a Republican as
solicitor general." And I reviewed several Republicans who I thought
would meet the criteria. This was not working particularly well with
the president.
At the end of the day, I made my final recommendation to him,
but it gave him comfort that I had discussed a number of people
before making the argument for why it should be Seth. But I do
think there is something to be said [for appointing a solicitor general
of the other party]. A person would have to be particularly
comfortable in that role, and sometimes there are positions that you
might have other people argue. It may be a point that we have
passed in our politics, but I thought at that moment in time it was at
least worth the president considering.
Thomas Lee: I want to make sure and leave plenty of time for
audience questions. But before we do that, we have about a halfhour left. In that time, let me suggest a couple of topics. Who is the
solicitor general's client? How does the solicitor general go about
resolving conflict among various departments or agencies of the
federal government or the executive branch? We have heard lots of
fun war stories about briefs that take two contrary positions. Judge
Easterbrook told us about the Buckle:J77 case and three different
briefs being filed. So there are some creative ways of resolving
conflict. That is one issue that has come up.

276. Senator Orrin Hatch, of Utah, was chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee at
the time.
277. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
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Another related one has to do with the potential tension
between the solicitor general's role as advocate to the executive
branch pursuing the broad policy vision of the administration versus
the solicitor general's role as an officer of the court.
General Dellinger or General Waxman, would either of you like
to address either of those? I know they have come up repeatedly, but
I thought that now that we have got all of you here, maybe we could
follow up since those seem to have been two important themes.

Seth Waxman: I will be happy to do the first one. In many ways,
for me the most exciting aspect of being solicitor general was having
the responsibility for making the kinds of decisions that I adverted to
before. In a country of 280 million souls, how does one ascertain
what the interests of the United States are in litigation? That is the
solicitor general's most challenging and exciting mission.
The legislative history of the 1870 Judiciary Act 278 is utterly clear
that that responsibility is to decide and advocate positions that are in
the interests of the United States. How' does one decide that? We
are, if nothing else, a diverse and opinionated country. The way that
these decisions get made in the SG's Office-and as I understand it
this process has been relatively unchanged for decades at least-is for
the SG to consider the views of all components of the government
before formulating a position. The Solicitor General's Office does
not go around trying to find intriguing policy issues to attack,
righteous positions to take, or great cases to bring. It is an entirely
reactive office.
Let's say a prosecutor loses a suppression motion, or there is an
important case the Environment Division wants to intervene in, or
the Civil Rights Division wants to file an amicus brief, or a Treasury
ruling is struck down, or the Consumer Products Safety Commission
loses an important consent decree request, or anything of the sort.
No appeal is permitted unless the solicitor general approves, in
writing. The protocol is that the affected (losing) component of the
government must submit to the SG an analytic memorandum that
attaches all the relevant papers, explains the context, the legal issues,
the reasons why it is in the interest of the United States to take it to
the next step, and why the position that they advocate is correct.

278. Judiciary Act ofl870, ch. 150,16 Stat. 162 (1870).
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The solicitor general does not just review that memo and agree
or disagree. It is immediately forwarded to all components of the
executive branch, whether within the Justice Department or outside,
with either a policy or a law enforcement interest in that issue. These
components are given the opportunity to express their own
institutional views on the recommendation. The idea here is that the
executive branch, with all of its hundreds of different offices and
departments, serves as a surrogate for the country as a whole. When
all the memos arrive, the case is assigned to a staff lawyer in the SG's
Office, who writes his or her own analytic memo making a
recommendation. The package then goes to one of the four deputies
who adds his or her own recommendation. About half a dozen of
these little (or big) bundles land in the solicitor general's in-box
every day.
Sometimes, there is a significant difference of opinion about
what the United States should do. When that occurs, either one of
my deputies or I would meet with representatives of all of the
interested components. People would come together, having
considered each other's institutional positions, to try and see if there
was a way to hammer out a consensus view, or at least to understand
each other's views. It's amazing how men and women of great
intelligence and dedication can see things differently depending on
the institutional perspective they bring to an issue. The entire process
of trying to arrive at the position that best reflects the position of the
United States is tremendously edifying; it's a shame more people
cannot observe this function of government. It is essentially through
this cooperative, collaborative effort that the SG receives the
information and insight necessary to make the decision. That is the
most thrilling part of the job.
Walter Dellinger: As a footnote to that, even if there were only
one department or agency involved, it is critically important, I think,
and a point that we have gone a day and a half without mentioning,
that the Solicitor General's Office is made up of generalists,
including the solicitor general. You could imagine a system with
some provision resolving conflicts among agencies where each of our
great cabinet departments and agencies has general counsels, men
and women of generally a great ability, who would advance their
own arguments in court, or the ninety-three U.S. Attorney's Offices
could carry both, but the fact that generalists bring their judgment
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to bear upon questions often makes an enormous difference. For
people who work in a single area for a single agency, it is very
difficult from that perspective to have the broader interest of the
United States in mind. Even if you were not resolving conflicts, the
fact that you are reviewing judgments of particularized agencies, you
are familiar with the Court and where its sentiments are, and you are
taking into account a larger base of non-specialized information, I
think, is altogether salutary for the positive development of the law.
Charles Fried: It is particularly appropriate because, unlike the
countries in which the Health and Human Services [Department]
would bring social security matters to a social security court, and
Department of Labor [matters would go] to a labor board, not only
is the Solicitor General's Office an office of generalists, so is the
Supreme Court. So it is generalists talking to generalists, and that is a
very important translation function.
Seth Waxman: It is very important, I think, to bear in mind that
the world Walter just posited-where each U.S. attorney and each
agency head is free to argue his or her own view of the interest of the
United States to the Court-is precisely, and I mean exactly, what
produced the position of solicitor general in the first place, and with
very strong institutional impetus from the Supreme Court. In a series
of nineteenth century cases, the Court had made rather clear that it
had just about had it with different people standing up in different
cases and saying, "The position of the United States on this law or
this legal principle is X,"-that is, whatever was necessary in order to
win the case in that particular instance-and then have somebody
else later stand up in another case and say, "Well, in this case, you
know, the position of the United States is Y" The conference report
that accompanies the 1870 Judiciary Act explains Congress's vision
about the role of the solicitor general. It says something very close to
these exact words: "We propose to appoint a man of sufficient
learning and intelligence and ability that he may appear in any court
in the land from New Orleans to New York"-which apparently
were the known limits of the civilized world at the time-"and there
present the interest of the United States as it should be presented."
That unifying theme-that the United States has to speak with one
voice and provide the same interpretation of law whether it is in a
state court in Maine or a federal court in San Diego-was the
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animating principle behind creation of the position, and it remains
the animating principle of the office to this very day.
Kenneth Starr: Let me add a point that I think reinforces the
structural and process points that are being made. What you have
heard in the last few minutes in terms of structure and process, I
think, is quite powerfully true. I think it rings true with anyone who
is privileged to serve in the office, whether as solicitor general or in a
career position. There are those issues, however, where the lens
through which one looks at the world will give rise to certain
questions. Certainly the discussion thus far brings to mind the lens of
concern about judicial power. When one is in the executive branch,
frequently it is a Federalist Nos. 47 and 51 concern on the part of the
executive about the legislative power seeking to bring everything
into its vortex, but obviously it depends upon the context. I do recall
quite vividly that when I came into the office (ironically after I had
served in the judiciary), one of the recurring areas of concern-and
the lens [through which] we examined the world caused us to be
concerned-was about the exercise of the judicial power in ways that
seemed to trench upon, or at least compromise, institutions of
self-government. And so Charles referred to consent decrees and so
forth. We found continually in my four years in the office issues with
respect to: Have the judges gone too far? Has judicial power, even if
appropriately exercised at the outset, been extended overmuch? Has
there been a displacement of institutions of representative
government? And that lens may vary somewhat. I doubt if it is a
dramatic variance, but I think there will be subtle variances in the
way that one looks at the world, and that may, at times, frankly,
trump the very considered process-type points that have been made.
Drew Days: I think the question, "who is the client?" is really a
riddle. When I was the head of the Civil Rights Division and I woke
up in the morning, I knew who my client was. I was my client. And
the head of the Antitrust Division knew that he or she was a client
because these are the policymaking institutions within the Justice
Department. As solicitor general, when I woke up I had no clue who
my client was or was going to be during the day. I think it is more a
process of ruling out than ruling in. We know who are not our
clients: states, municipalities, private parties for the most part. But
when it comes down to the 9uestion of who is the client, it really is a
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matter of analyzing the situation and reasoning through a situation
to determine: Are there federal laws involved? Are there federal
interests at issue? And so forth and so on. For purposes of
conversation, I guess that entity becomes one's client. But it could
be that by the end of the day, a better client will have come down
the pike.
Question from Audience: Because of the intensity of the work
of the solicitor general, are we moving towards a tradition and
expectation that the solicitor general would serve four years despite
the political fortunes of the president, and is it the kind of job, given
its intensity, in which somebody could serve eight years?
Charles Fried: There has only been one solicitor general in
recent times who approached that, and that is Erwin Griswold. He
served Lyndon Johnson and then he served Nixon in the first Nixon
administration, but that is the last time that happened. I would think
it very unfortunate-not a good idea-for two reasons. First, you
lose freshness. You think you own the office. You think it is yours,
and you begin to be a bureaucrat in it rather than a fresh
intelligence. That is the first thing. And the second, as everybody has
in various degrees and in various ways acknowledged or even
emphasized, is the fact that at the end of the day the solicitor general
speaks as the appointee of the president. Well, that is much
attenuated if you are just routinely kept on. It is the reason, quite
frankly, why I made clear a year before the end of the Reagan
administration that at the end of that administration I would move
on.
Question from Audience: What is the process by which a
president appoints a solicitor general, and do you see common
threads that run through that process?
Drew Days: Ken told me I should answer this, and I am not sure
quite how to answer it. I think it is often like a bolt of lightning. It is
somewhat fickle. Let's put it this way: it does not hurt to be the
lawyer who argues the case before the Supreme Court that results in
a person being named the president of the United States. We can
start there. Someone said to me, "Well, do you think he's going to
name Ted Olson as solicitor general?" I said, "Well, that's a pretty
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good possibility." He said, "Well, don't you think it would be seen
as a quid pro quo?" I said, "If not now, when?"
It varies. The people who have occupied the SG's Office have
been academics, lawyers, judges, and for the most part, they have
been very close to the presidents from a political standpoint, a family
standpoint. They are politically connected. So there is no one
process. It really changes from administration to administration.
I wanted very much to be solicitor general, but there continued
to be a problem of finding an attorney general for the Clinton
administration. I found that to be a real impediment to my making
my case to the attorney general. First it was Zoe Baird, and then
Judge Kimba Wood, and then finally Janet Reno.279 All the while I
was waiting to be discovered. And it happened.
Kenneth Starr: I think in the first Bush administration-and I
am sure Charles can speak with more authority to this, even though
he was not part of the administration-but I think there was a
concentrated effort to find a judge. I think those who were seriously
considered were, in the main, judges. But if you go back over the last
generation, I think Drew's answer is exactly right. They are drawn
from the professorial ranks or the judicial ranks or some combination
thereof, or then, logically, those who have served in the Justice
Department-and Seth is a beautiful example of a distinguished
lawyer in private practice who then proved his mettle in the Justice
Department. But I think that is a tougher route. At least, it is
certainly tougher at the outset of the administration, where there will
be a tendency, I think, to go to the academy, a Professor Bork, a
Judge McCree, a Dean Griswold, and the like-and Professor [Rex]
Lee.
Walter Dellinger: I know that Drew and Seth and I, none of us
knew the president before going into the Justice Department. I did
not. Did you, Ken?

279. In 1993, President Clinton nominated Zoe Baird, then Kimba Wood, to serve as
attorney general, but both withdrew their nominations. Janet Reno was ultimately nominated
and confirmed as President Clinton's attorney general.
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Kenneth Starr: I knew the president, but not all that terribly
well, and [our acquaintance] was rather ancient. I knew him when he
was in Congress in Texas.
Walter Dellinger: And Charles, you did not know President
Reagan?
Charles Fried: I did not know the president. My situation was
special and rather like Seth's in a way. I had been the principal
deputy in the office and the office was vacant from, I think it was
March or so, until I was named. So, I was acting in the office and
doing all these things and they had a chance to get a really good
look at me. There was the abortion brief80 and also the brief in the
Wygant 281 case. I had a big hand in writing it, and so did Sam Alito,
who had this marvelous phrase saying that a particular Mrican
American baseball player would not have served as a great role model
if the fences had been pulled in every time he was up at bat, a point
which some people were greatly offended by because they thought it
to be pamphleteering. I thought it was entirely appropriate. If it had
been made in the other direction, it would have been applauded
rather than deplored by the New York Times. But I was able to bring
those briefs to the senators upon my courtesy calls and say, "Now,
this is what you will get. Take it or leave it." So, I had been in the
job. That is unusual.
On the question of judges, you are quite right. I had a
conversation with the attorney general before I left. He asked for my
suggestion, and I gave him a list of three names, all three of whom
were judges. [About] one of them I said, "The situation may
develop where you may want to name a Democrat." So there were
two Republicans and one Democrat.
Question from Audience: General Days made a comment
about the Carter administration and delegation skills, and referred to
quite different leadership traits. General Waxman made a comment
about the decisive nature of the office and how to make the calls.
General Starr [emphasized] the opposite-represent the president,

280. Thornburgh v. Am. Coli. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986).
281. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. ofEduc., 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
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more or less. From what you have seen, [which approach] would you
say was more effective?

Seth Waxman: I will take a crack at it just because I came down
sort of emphatically in favor of the decisive role. The year in which I
worked as Walter Dellinger's deputy really was the most wondrous
professional period I have ever had. For both Walter and me, it was
our first time in the Solicitor General's Office. Walter came to the
job from a distinguished career in the academy. I think Walter had
handled one or two complex cases as a consultant, otherwise his
background was purely of the academy. By contrast, I had spent
almost two decades as a litigator-trying and arguing cases in state
and federal courts (including one case in the Supreme Court). We
had offices in close proximity, and on the weekends, we would
inevitably be there on Saturdays and Sundays working in our quiet
and majestic offices. We used to go back and forth in our socks to
talk about the cases we were handling. At one point several months
into the job, I recall Walter saying, "You know, I'm wrestling with
twenty-odd fascinating issues right now. Back in myoId job, I would
have spent two years arriving at my concluded views. First, I'd
arrange a research seminar where I would have a bunch of students
thinking, writing papers about it. Then I would get a grant to think
about it myself. Then I would give some talks. Maybe I would take a
semester visiting at another institution and then teach a full course
on the subject. Mter two years, I would publish a full-blown article
setting forth my concluded views. But here, in this office, we have to
make decisions in these cases in a week or two week's time. The time
compression is just amazing." My response to Walter was, "You
know, I have exactly the opposite reaction. In my prior life,
everything was like this. [Waxman repeatedly snaps his fingers.] We
were constantly under pressure to make decisions and present them
to courts-in briefs, in arguments, and through witnesses and
documents." In the world I inhabited before joining the SG's Office,
we'd receive an order from court giving us twenty-four hours to
submit a brief on some emergency matter. Or, a client needed to
know right away whether we are going to go in and seek a temporary
restraining order. I told Walter that, in my new position, I felt the
tremendous luxury of having several whole weeks to decide
important issues. Those are two perspectives of it. Thank goodness
the SG has weeks to decide important things; but thank goodness
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too that at the end of that fixed period a decision has to be made.
Otherwise, there are a raft of issues we'd still be puzzling over.
Walter Dellinger: Let. me just add this, to go back to the
previous question [about selecting a solicitor general]. There are
many different kinds of backgrounds. All things being equal, I would
prefer having a very senior judge of the United States Court of
Appeals, even though only one of this distinguished group meets
that description. And even though none of this distinguished group
were close to the president, I think on balance the country and the
department are going to be very well served by the fact that Solicitor
General Olson is close to and does have the complete confidence of
the president. I do not think that means he brings politics to the
Justice Department. I think that means that when he listens to the
career deputies, to the Ed Needlers and to the Michael Dreebens,
when he hears from the career people in all of the departments and
he reaches a decision about what is in the long-range interests, no
one is going to second-guess Ted Olson at the White House. I think
all things being equal, that is very, very good for the department. He
will be situated in the department; he will be hearing from these
people; he will be formulating his judgments with that in mind; and
there will be no one in this administration that can possibly
second-guess or backdoor Ted Olson. I think everything else being
equal, that is a good thing to have as solicitor general.
Question from Audience: We have heard a lot about the
representation by the Solicitor General's Office of the executive
branch and advocating for the president. I would like to know, just
to broaden the discussion to the legislative branch, how were the
interactions [with the legislative branch]? Were there any interactions
or attempts to influence from the legislative branch? We have heard
about the executive input. But we have heard several times that you
represent the whole government. Should the legislature have its own
solicitor g e n e r a l ? '
Charles Fried: The very most sufficient reason why the solicitor
general so assiduously defends the constitutionality of acts of
Congress is that if he did not, there would not be such an office.
Now, there may be other reasons. Indeed, there are. But, as I say,
that is a sufficient reason.
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Drew Days: Indeed, there is an office in the Senate and one that
rotates in the House of Representatives as a result of the 1978 Ethics
in Government Act. 282 It is a very interesting statute because it
authorizes lawyers from the Congress to represent the Congress in
the Supreme Court on matters that have to do with the power of the
Congress. That, however, does not respond to Charles's point,
which is a major one: to the extent that the solicitor general allows
cases to be handled by the lawyers in the Congress, he loses control
over the matters, loses the very thing that he cherishes most, and
that is being able to control the movement of cases to the Supreme
Court and engaging in what we like to call the orderly development
of the law.
But [consider] a situation that we discussed in another context:
what happens when the solicitor general does not want to or does
not feel capable of defending an act of Congress that has been
challenged as unconstitutional? Perhaps others on the panel have had
this experience as well. But I had a couple of situations where I
found that I could not in good conscience represent the position of
the Congress with respect to a statute. One of the cases had to do
with a statute that was passed in 1935, I believe, and it was so out of
touch with modern understandings of gender equality that quite
frankly I did not feel that I wanted to be the one in the Clinton
administration taking a position that upheld discriminatory treatment
of women as compared to men with respect to immigration and
citizenship. What happened in that case was as required by the
statute: the attorney general is required to notify the leaders of the
Congress if she is not going to defend the statute, which then
triggers the power of the lawyers in the Congress to provide the
defense. But I think this had a happy ending. We told Congress that
we would not defend, but we then worked with a committee of
Congress to prepare a fixer amendment to the statute which tended
to remove the constitutional problem and allow life to go on without
any headaches-or almost no headaches.
Kenneth Starr: Let me add a brief footnote in terms of the
collaborative process that was evident during my tenure in the case

282. Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521,92 Stat. 1824 (codified as
amended at 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 101-505 (2000)).
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of Nixon v. United States. 283 Walter Nixon [was] a district judge who
was impeached. Then in his trial in the Senate [he] was subjected to
what he viewed as an unconstitutional process, namely a fact-finding
or fact-gathering, I should say, by a committee of the Senate, some
ten Senators, five from each party. The matter wended its way to the
Supreme Court. And even though the constitutionality of the
procedures of the United States Senate was at issue in the case, it still
fell, with absolutely no rancor whatsoever, to the solicitor general to
defend the constitutionality [of the Senate procedures] if it could be
done, and it obviously was easy for us to in fact do that. The
Supreme Court eventually upheld the power of the Senate to engage
in such fact-gathering by a committee as long as there was a trial
before the full body of the Senate. But in that process we worked
very collaboratively with the very distinguished counsel to the senate,
Mike Davidson, and his staff. Mike, I believe, served for about
twenty years, and was a wonderful repository of information as well
as guidance. And so we had any number of meetings as well as the
receiving of information from the historical materials that Mike and
his staff had very assiduously gathered. And we viewed that as simply
our function. That was our role: to defend in that context the
prerogatives of the Senate.

Thomas Lee: That is about all the time we have. I do not know
that you will find five people whose time is more in demand than
these five gentlemen. I want them to know on behalf of all of us how
grateful we are for their giving us of their time today.
Dean Reese Hansen: I think that brings us to the moment of
conclusion of the conference. We wish all of our participants
Godspeed and best wishes as you travel home. May the skies be
smooth and sailing clear and passage safe. We hope to have you each
back sometime soon for another occasion.

283. 506

u.s. 224 (1993).
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